Fiche du document
2018
- handle: 10670/1.knatlo
- halshs: halshs-01643656
- doi: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2017.10.004
- PRODINRA: 420575
- WOS: 000423421100001
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2017.10.004
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation Contract Deforestation Hidden information Conditionality Incentives Performance D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O1 - Economic Development/O.O1.O13 - Agriculture • Natural Resources • Energy • Environment • Other Primary Products Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation/Q.Q2.Q23 - Forestry Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q54 - Climate • Natural Disasters and Their Management • Global WarmingSujets proches
Disforestation Depletion of forests Conversion, Forest Forest conversion Forest depletion Forest-land conversionCiter ce document
Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline et al., « Designing REDD+ contracts to resolve additionality issues », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2017.10.004
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Résumé
To address the issue of potential information asymmetries inherent in the estimation of deforestation baselines required by the current Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation+ (REDD+) scheme, we offer a theoretical analysis of an extended scheme relying on the theory of incentives. We compare two types of contracts: a deforestation-based contract and a policy-based contract. Each of them implies a dramatically different information rent/efficiency trade-off due to domestic implementation and transaction costs. If the contract is deforestation-based (resp. policy-based), information rents are awarded to countries with the ex ante lowest (resp. highest) intended deforestation. We show that a general contract can be offered to recipient countries in which the type of instrument proposed is endogenous, independent of the historical trend, unlike the current REDD+ mechanism. Dividing countries into two groups corresponding to the deforestation-based instrument and the policy-based instrument helps the donor country to obtain efficient deforestation and avoided deforestation levels.