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22 avril 2014
- handle: 10670/1.knw726
- hal: hal-00723189
- doi: 10.1155/2014/268427
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1155/2014/268427
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Mots-clés
information acquisition heterogeneous beliefs heterogeneous estimations Grossman-Stiglitz paradox costly information MSC: 91Gxx, MSC 91Bxx, MSC 97M30 -fin]/General Finance [q-fin.GN] -fin]/Computational Finance [q-fin.CP] -fin]/Trading and Market Microstructure [q-fin.TR]Sujets proches
Funds Funding Finance, commerce, confiscations, etcCiter ce document
Agnes Bialecki et al., « Existence of an Equilibrium for Lower Semicontinuous Information Acquisition Functions », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1155/2014/268427
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Résumé
We consider a two-period model in which a continuum of agents trade in a context of costly information acquisition and systematic heterogeneous expectations biases. Because of systematic biases agents are supposed not to learn from others' decisions. In a previous work under somehow strong technical assumptions a market equilibrium was proved to exist and the supply and demand functions were proved to be strictly monotonic with respect to the price. Here we extend these results under very weak technical assumptions. We also prove that the equilibrium price maximizes the trading volume and further additional properties (such as the antimonotonicity of the trading volume with respect to the marginal information price).