Fiche du document
Auteurs
Date
1 janvier 2009
Discipline
Type de document
Périmètre
Langue
Identifiants
- handle: 10670/1.ko14jp
- hal: hal-00464577
Collection
Organisation
Mots-clés
Public offer Private offer lemons marketSujets proches
Negotiations Bargaining Haggling Negotiating Higgling Dickering Bargaining Labor negotiationsCiter ce document
Nicolas Vieille et al., « Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.ko14jp
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
We study the role of observability in bargaining with correlated values. Short-run buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller. When previous offers are observable, bargaining is likely to end up in an impasse. In contrast, when offers are hidden, agreement is always reached, although with delay.