Fiche du document
2023
- handle: 10670/1.kq2vd9
- hal: hal-04239546
- doi: 10.1007/s13235-023-00526-7
- WOS: WOS:001070302200001
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s13235-023-00526-7
Mots-clés
Horizontal mergers War of attrition Monopolization Markov-perfect equilibrium C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L12 - Monopoly • Monopolization StrategiesSujets proches
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Didier Laussel, « Sequential Mergers and Delayed Monopolization in Triopoly », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1007/s13235-023-00526-7
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Résumé
Under triopoly and Cournot competition, we study an infinite horizon Markov perfect equilibrium merger game in which in each period one of the firms (“the Buyer”) selects a bid price and then the two sellers accept or reject this offer with some probability. The possibility of a “war of attrition” equilibrium in which the seller who outlasts the other is then able to sell in the following period at a greater price, is a distinct feature of the model. Delayed monopolization is all the more likely when the discount factor is small and the ratio duopoly/ triopoly profits is important. Two other equilibria are shown to be possible: an unmerged and an immediate monopolization equilibrium. Each equilibrium is shown to correspond to a different set of parameter values. The two special cases of linear and constant price elastic demand functions are fully characterized.