2023
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s13235-023-00526-7
Didier Laussel, « Sequential Mergers and Delayed Monopolization in Triopoly », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1007/s13235-023-00526-7
Under triopoly and Cournot competition, we study an infinite horizon Markov perfect equilibrium merger game in which in each period one of the firms (“the Buyer”) selects a bid price and then the two sellers accept or reject this offer with some probability. The possibility of a “war of attrition” equilibrium in which the seller who outlasts the other is then able to sell in the following period at a greater price, is a distinct feature of the model. Delayed monopolization is all the more likely when the discount factor is small and the ratio duopoly/ triopoly profits is important. Two other equilibria are shown to be possible: an unmerged and an immediate monopolization equilibrium. Each equilibrium is shown to correspond to a different set of parameter values. The two special cases of linear and constant price elastic demand functions are fully characterized.