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- handle: 10670/1.kviyo4
- halshs: halshs-00754421
- doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.04.004
- PRODINRA: 316712
- WOS: 000281491900014
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.04.004
Mots-clés
Federalism Interest groups Inter-jurisdictional externalities Inter-state trade barriers Multinational firms P - Economic Systems/P.P2 - Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies/P.P2.P26 - Political Economy • Property Rights H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H77 - Intergovernmental Relations • Federalism • Secession F - International Economics/F.F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business/F.F2.F23 - Multinational Firms • International Business F - International Economics/F.F1 - Trade/F.F1.F15 - Economic Integration D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and ImplementationSujets proches
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Sergei Guriev et al., « Interest Group Politics in a Federation », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.04.004
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Résumé
The optimal degree of decentralization depends on the importance of inter-state externalities of local policies. We show that inter-state externalities are determined by the spatial distribution of interest groups within the country. Interest groups who have multi-state scope internalize inter-state externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests within a single state. We use variation in the geographic boundaries of politically-powerful industrial interests to estimate the effect of inter-state externalities on firm performance. Using firm-level panel data from a peripheralized federation, Russia in 1996-2003, we show that, controlling for firm fixed effects, the performance of firms substantially improves with an increase in the number of neighboring regions under influence of multi-regional business groups compared to the number influenced by local business groups. Our findings have implications for the literatures on federalism and on international trade as trade restrictions are a common source of inter-state externalities.