Fiche du document
2020
- handle: 10670/1.l7wq6m
- hal: hal-02902690
- doi: 10.1007/s11151-019-09744-z
- WOS: 000574640400001
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s11151-019-09744-z
Mots-clés
Differentiation Price discrimination Retail pricing Search model strategic obfuscation D - Microeconomics D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L - Industrial Organization L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M3 - Marketing and Advertising/M.M3.M31 - MarketingSujets proches
Price policy, Industrial Retail pricing Price policy Retail marketing Consumer goods--Marketing Retail trade--Marketing Domestic marketingCiter ce document
Zohra Bouamra et al., « Strategic Obfuscation and Retail Pricing », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1007/s11151-019-09744-z
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Résumé
Consumer-product manufacturers—and retailers that sell their products—often sell slightly differentiated items for reasons other than appealing to heterogeneous tastes—different sizes of a popular brand, or different flavors in a common product line for instance. We argue that this practice is a form of strategic obfuscation, which is intended to make price-comparison more difficult, and thereby raise margins on non-comparable products. We test our hypothesis with the use of examples from consumer-packaged good categories in German and French retail scanner data. We find that—after controlling for other explanations for how margins can vary with package size and type—we cannot rule out strategic obfuscation as a feature of our retail sales data.