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Mots-clés
H - Public Economics/H.H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies/H.H5.H51 - Government Expenditures and Health I - Health, Education, and Welfare/I.I1 - Health/I.I1.I18 - Government Policy • Regulation • Public Health O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O1 - Economic Development/O.O1.O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic DevelopmentSujets proches
Wellness Personal health Biography--HealthCiter ce document
Elise Huillery et al., « Financial Incentives are Counterproductive in Non-Profit Sectors: Evidence from a Health Experiment », Archive ouverte de Sciences Po (SPIRE), ID : 10670/1.la1khg
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Résumé
Financial incentives for service providers are becoming a common strategy to improve service delivery. However, this strategy will only work if demand for the service responds as expected. Using a eld experiment in the Democratic Republic of Congo, we show that introducing a performance-based financing mechanism in the health sector has counterproductive effects because demand is non-standard: despite reduced prices and eased access, demand for health decreased, child health deteriorated, workers' revenue dropped. Ironically, expected perverse effects of incentives on worker behavior were not realized: incentives led to more effort from health workers on rewarded activities without deterring effort on non-rewarded activities, nor inducing significant score manipulation or free-riding. We also find a decline in worker motivation following the removal of the incentives, below what it would have been in the absence of exposure to the incentives. Management tools used in for-pro t sectors are thus inappropriate in non-pro t sectors such as health where user and worker rationalities are specific.