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- handle: 10670/1.lgkg43
- hal: hal-03214933
- doi: 10.1016/j.joep.2021.102378
- WOS: 000766627900006
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.joep.2021.102378
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Goal-oriented agents incentives matching market D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D86 - Economics of Contract: TheorySujets proches
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Inés Macho-Stadler et al., « Goal-oriented agents in a market », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.joep.2021.102378
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Résumé
We consider a market where "standard" risk-neutral agents coexist with "goaloriented" agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payoff (the "trigger") to fulfill a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and receive the trigger with positive probability. Moreover, goal and monetary incentives are complementary: goaloriented agents receive stronger monetary incentives. Finally, we discuss policy interventions in relevant environments.