Fiche du document
2015
- handle: 10670/1.lku6ao
- hal: hal-01167909
- doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2014.12.013
- SCIENCESPO: 2441/2si2or72bc8ed899298h75877i
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jinteco.2014.12.013
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/hdl/2441/2si2or72bc8ed899298h75877i
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
product differenciation export promotion industrial policy trade asymetric information product quality F - International Economics/F.F1 - Trade/F.F1.F12 - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies • Fragmentation F - International Economics/F.F1 - Trade/F.F1.F13 - Trade Policy • International Trade Organizations L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L15 - Information and Product Quality • Standardization and Compatibility L - Industrial Organization/L.L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy/L.L5.L52 - Industrial Policy • Sectoral Planning Methods O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O1 - Economic Development/O.O1.O14 - Industrialization • Manufacturing and Service Industries • Choice of Technology O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O2 - Development Planning and Policy/O.O2.O24 - Trade Policy • Factor Movement Policy • Foreign Exchange PolicySujets proches
Trade Commercial trade Foreign trade Trade TradeCiter ce document
Julia Cage et al., « Improving “National Brands”: Reputation for Quality and Export Promotion Strategies », Archive ouverte de Sciences Po (SPIRE), ID : 10.1016/j.jinteco.2014.12.013
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
This paper studies the effect of firm and country reputation on exports when buyers cannot observe quality prior to purchase. Firm-level demand is determined by expected quality, which is driven by the dynamics of consumer learning through experience and the country of origin’s reputation for quality. We show that asymmetric information can result in multiple steady-state equilibria with endogenous reputation. We identify two types of steady states: a high-quality equilibrium (HQE) and a low-quality equilibrium (LQE). In a LQE, only the lowest-quality and the highest-quality firms are active; a range of relatively high-quality firms are permanently kept out of the market by the informational friction. Countries with bad quality reputation can therefore be locked into exporting low-quality, low-cost goods. Our model delivers novel insights about the dynamic impact of trade policies. First, an export subsidy increases the steady-state average qualityof exports and welfare in a LQE, but decreases both quality and welfare in a HQE. Second, there is a tax/subsidy scheme based on the duration of export experience that replicates the perfect information outcome. Third, a minimum quality standard can help an economy initially in a LQE moving to a HQE.