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- handle: 10670/1.lmkbqs
- hal: hal-01097121
- doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.09.010
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.09.010
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Mots-clés
Limited Commitment Constrained Pareto Efficiency High Implied Interest Rates D - Microeconomics/D.D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium/D.D5.D50 - General D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D61 - Allocative Efficiency • Cost–Benefit AnalysisSujets proches
Trade Commercial trade Foreign trade Celestial horizon Apparent horizon Real horizon Sensible horizon Money market rates Rates, Interest Rate of interest Infinity Fortunes Household income Personal income Family income Funds Funding Balancing (Physics) Balance (Physics) Balance Trade War claims Claims--Law and legislation International claims Private claims Trade Agency (Philosophy) Agents Person (Philosophy) Finance, commerce, confiscations, etc Methods of analysis Analysis and chemistry Analytical methods Chemical analysis Analysis methods Analysis and examinationCiter ce document
Victor Filipe Martins da Rocha et al., « Constrained Efficiency Without Commitment », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.09.010
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Résumé
We consider an infinite horizon economy where agents share income risks by trading a complete set of contingent claims but cannot commit to their promises. Allocations are restricted to be self-enforcing relative to autarchic reservation utilities. We provide a general characterization of constrained Pareto efficiency without assuming that there are uniform gains to trade. Our results extend those in Bloise and Reichlin (2011) in several aspects.