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1 juillet 2020
- handle: 10670/1.luyfyj
- hal: hal-02612764
- doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109198
- WOS: 000540816400008
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109198
Mots-clés
Vertical relationships Exclusive vs non exclusive relationships Auctions D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L14 - Transactional Relationships • Contracts and Reputation • NetworksSujets proches
Negotiations Bargaining Haggling Negotiating Higgling DickeringCiter ce document
Emanuele Bacchiega et al., « Auctions vs. negotiations in vertically related markets », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109198
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Résumé
In a two-tier industry with bottleneck upstream and two downstream firms producing vertically differentiated goods, we identify conditions under which the upstream supplier chooses exclusive or non-exclusive negotiations, or an English auction to sell its essential input. Auctioning off a two-part tariff contract is optimal for the supplier when its bargaining power is low and the final goods are not too differentiated. Otherwise, the supplier enters into exclusive or non-exclusive negotiations with the downstream firm(s). Finally, in contrast to previous findings, an auction is never welfare superior to negotiations.