1 juillet 2020
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109198
Emanuele Bacchiega et al., « Auctions vs. negotiations in vertically related markets », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109198
In a two-tier industry with bottleneck upstream and two downstream firms producing vertically differentiated goods, we identify conditions under which the upstream supplier chooses exclusive or non-exclusive negotiations, or an English auction to sell its essential input. Auctioning off a two-part tariff contract is optimal for the supplier when its bargaining power is low and the final goods are not too differentiated. Otherwise, the supplier enters into exclusive or non-exclusive negotiations with the downstream firm(s). Finally, in contrast to previous findings, an auction is never welfare superior to negotiations.