Fiche du document
2013
- handle: 10670/1.m0jaz9
- hal: hal-00923594
- doi: 10.1155/2013/761482
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1155/2013/761482
Mots-clés
sanction observation dictator and ultimatum games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual BehaviorSujets proches
divertissement jeuxCiter ce document
Pierre Garrouste et al., « The Respective Effects of Being Observed and Sanctioned in Modified Dictator and Ultimatum Games », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1155/2013/761482
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
We experiment within a laboratory the respective effects of being observed and sanctioned in both a dictator and an ultimatum game. We obtain the classical results that individuals do not play the subgame perfect equilibria. We also show that being observed increases the offers made by the proposer in the dictator game but this effect is difficult to identify in the ultimatum game. We also find that in the dictator game, the more the individuals are sensitive to observation the less they are to sanction.