Fiche du document
2023
- handle: 10670/1.mkibhm
- hal: hal-03375907
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Bilateral oligopoly Bargaining Retail mergers Soft drink industry C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C78 - Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure • Size Distribution of Firms L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L14 - Transactional Relationships • Contracts and Reputation • Networks L - Industrial Organization/L.L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies/L.L4.L41 - Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L - Industrial Organization/L.L8 - Industry Studies: Services/L.L8.L81 - Retail and Wholesale Trade • e-CommerceSujets proches
Negotiations Bargaining Haggling Negotiating Higgling Dickering Bargaining Labor negotiationsCiter ce document
Céline Bonnet et al., « The Buyer Power Effect of Retail Mergers: An Empirical Model of Bargaining with Equilibrium of Fear », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.mkibhm
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Résumé
We develop a bilateral oligopoly framework with manufacturer-retailer bargaining to analyze the impact of retail mergers on market outcomes. We show that the surplus division between manufacturers and retailers depends on three bargaining forces and can be interpreted in terms of an “equilibrium of fear”. We estimate our framework in the French soft drink industry and find that retailers have greater bargaining power than manufacturers. Using counterfactual simulations, we highlight that retail mergers increase retailers’ fear of disagreement relative to that of manufacturers, which weakens their buyer power and leads to higher wholesale and retail prices.