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2018
- handle: 10670/1.moatut
- halshs: halshs-01631521
- doi: 10.1111/iere.12275
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/iere.12275
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
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Francis Bloch et al., « Rumors and social networks », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1111/iere.12275
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This article studies the transmission of rumors in social networks. We consider a model with biased and unbiased agents. Biased agents want to enforce a specific decision and unbiased agents to match the true state. One agent learns the true state and sends a message to her neighbors, who decide whether or not to transmit it further. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game, show that the social network can act as a filter, and that biased agents may have an incentive to limit their number.