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2023
- handle: 10670/1.mrcl0w
- hal: hal-04234940
- doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.09.027
- WOS: 001105957800001
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.09.027
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ , info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Recreational cannabis Legalization Crime Policy Regulation I - Health, Education, and Welfare/I.I1 - Health/I.I1.I18 - Government Policy • Regulation • Public Health K - Law and Economics/K.K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law/K.K3.K32 - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law K - Law and Economics/K.K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior/K.K4.K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law L - Industrial Organization/L.L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy/L.L5.L51 - Economics of RegulationSujets proches
Cannabis gigantea Gallow grass Cannabis sativa Cannabis indicaCiter ce document
Emmanuelle Auriol et al., « Weeding out the Dealers? The Economics of Cannabis Legalization », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.09.027
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Résumé
We model consumer choices for recreational cannabis in a risky environment and its supply under prohibition and legalization. While legalization reduces the profits of illegal providers, it increases cannabis consumption. This trade-off can be overcome by combining legalization with sanctions against the black market, and improvements to the quality of legal products. Numerical calibrations highlight how a policy mix can control the increase in cannabis consumption and throttle the illegal market. In the US, the eviction prices we predict to drive dealers out of business are much lower than the prices of legal cannabis in most of the states that opted for legalization, leaving room for the black market to flourish. Analyzing the compatibility of several policy goals sheds light on the less favorable outcomes of recent legalization reforms and suggests a new way forward.