Descartes’s Conception of Mind Through the Prism of Imagination: Cartesian Substance Dualism Questioned
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5 juin 2018
- handle: 10670/1.n1p5z4
- hal: hal-03357680
- doi: 10.1515/agph-2018-2002
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1515/agph-2018-2002
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Thinking Thoughts Mind Mind Science, Mental Mental philosophy Mind Behavioral sciences Mind-body connection Somatopsychics Mind-cure Body and soul (Philosophy) Mind-body relations Body and mind Human body--Psychological aspects Mind Human intelligence Intelligence Mind Cerebrum MindCiter ce document
Lynda Gaudemard, « Descartes’s Conception of Mind Through the Prism of Imagination: Cartesian Substance Dualism Questioned », HAL-SHS : philosophie, ID : 10.1515/agph-2018-2002
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: The aim of this article is to clarify an aspect of Descartes’s conception of mind that seriously impacts on the standard objections against Cartesian Dualism. By a close reading of Descartes’s writings on imagination, I argue that the capacity to imagine does not inhere as a mode in the mind itself, but only in the embodied mind, that is, a mind that is not united to the body does not possess the faculty to imagine. As a mode considered as a general property, and not as an instance of it, belongs to the essence of the substance, and as imagination (like sensation) arises from the mind-body union, then the problem arises of knowing to what extent a Cartesian embodied mind is separable from the body.