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4 avril 2024
- handle: 10670/1.n5n2td
- hal: hal-04532231
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D86 - Economics of Contract: TheorySujets proches
Blanks (Forms) Forms, blanks, etc Blank forms Flawedness Defectiveness Price policy, Industrial Retail pricing Price policy Industrial economics Market structure Funds Funding Balancing (Physics) Balance (Physics) Balance Economic theory Political economy Information, Asymmetric Asymmetric information Asymmetry, Information Finance, commerce, confiscations, etc divertissement jeuxCiter ce document
Andrea Attar et al., « Mediated Renegotiation », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.n5n2td
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Résumé
We develop a new approach to contract renegotiation under informational frictions. Specically, we consider mediated mechanisms which cannot be contingent on any subsequent offer, but can generate a new source of asymmetric information between the contracting parties. Taking as a reference the canonical framework of Fudenberg and Tirole (1990), we show that, if mediated mechanisms are allowed, the corresponding renegotiation game admits only one equilibrium allocation, which coincides with the second-best one. Thus, the inefficiencies typically associated to the threat of renegotiation may be completely offset by the design of more sophisticated trading mechanisms.