Fiche du document
- handle: 10670/1.nbtft6
- halshs: halshs-00754488
- doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.002
- PRODINRA: 316664
- WOS: 000274931000003
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.002
Mots-clés
Folk theorem Repeated game Individually rational payoff Minmax payoff Signals Entropy Conditional independence C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism DesignSujets proches
divertissement jeuxCiter ce document
Olivier Gossner et al., « When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.002
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
We study the relationship between a player's lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game with imperfect monitoring and this player's minmax payoff in the corresponding one-shot game. We characterize the signal structures under which these two payoffs coincide for any payoff matrix. Under an identifiability assumption, we further show that, if the monitoring structure of an infinitely repeated game "nearly" satisfies this condition, then these two payoffs are approximately equal, independently of the discount factor. This provides conditions under which existing folk theorems exactly characterize the limiting payoff set.