A Dialectical Account of Thought Experiments

Résumé En

In this paper, we defend a dialectical account of thought experiments. First, starting from a fairly broad characterization of what thought experiments are in general, we focus on a tension between two of their characteristics, a tension that puts thought experiments in what we will describe as an ontological state of unstable equilibrium. Second, having interpreted the epistemological debate between James Robert Brown and John Norton in terms of this ontological unstable equilibrium, we will clarify our position in this debate. To put it bluntly, we agree with Norton when he argues against Brown's Platonist positions, but we do not agree with him when he maintains that thought experiments are only arguments in the sense of valid arguments. According to us, scenarios that thought experiments involve always including some kind of opacity that can not be immediately reduced, thought experiments can not be assimilated to arguments. Third, we argue that, to account for the acquisition of knowledge that is at stake in thought experimenting, one should propose a dialectical account of argumentation.