France, the European Neutrals and the Kremlin, 1947-1981

Résumé En

When the Cold War started, France found it difficult to choose which side it was on due to the aura that the United States and the USSR had with public opinion after the Second World War and also due to the power of the French Communist Party (FCP). Moreover, Paris did not wish to break off its political and economic ties with Moscow's new satellites and, above all, wanted to broker an agreement with Stalin aimed at stopping Germany from causing any further damage. Although the absence of Soviet support for French ambitions for the Saar River, the development of East-West relations and the Marshall Plan put an end to these hesitations, at least those of the political leaders from the socialist and Christian democrat parties, French interest in the ideas of neutrality and neutralism did not weaken and regularly came back to the fore all through the Cold War.From the outset, although certain groups belonging to the non-communist left advocated "positive neutralism", the Gaullists called for greater independence from Washington and London. The concept of neutrality was never far and partly explains the attention given by some to countries which, voluntarily or forcibly, chose this option. Initially, neutrality was perceived by French diplomats and leaders in the context of their vision of French politics and according to a certain idea of the national interest, not from the angle of an abstract theoretical position of principle.Intrinsically, the neutral countries, with the exception of Switzerland, were of secondary strategic importance for France. But the French vision of European neutrality and of relations between the Neutrals and the Kremlin systematically reflected France's European orientations during the period, i.e. the German question, European construction, maintaining relations with Central and Eastern Europe, the defense of national territory and the concern for independence. From a broader viewpoint, the perception of the Neutrals and their relations with Moscow led the French to question the position of their country in international relations and the way to reinforce European security.Although this perception of neutrality underwent change in line with developments in the international situation, it reveals a certain continuity in French foreign policy from the 1950s to the 1980s. With respect to our particular focus, this continuity was expressed through the constant interest that Paris showed in Finland and Switzerland and in their relations with Moscow, more than with other countries. Sweden and Austria's relations with the USSR also remained under permanent scrutiny, but, as the Quai d'Orsay archives testify, this raised less questions. This paper will be limited to these four countries and will not refer to Yugoslavia which, in view of the importance attributed to it by France, is not comparable with the French vision of the Alpine and Nordic Neutrals. Moreover, as access to the archives is more limited concerning the 1980s, this analysis will cover the 1947-1981 period.How did French diplomacy perceive the relations that Finland, Switzerland, Sweden and Austria had with the Kremlin in fact? How did its vision of neutrality evolve from 1947 to 1981? Did the French consider the neutral status as being viable in the long term? What political and strategic relations did they have with these countries? If strategic questions with respect to the Neutrals-and particularly Switzerland-were above all present during the first years of the Cold War, which corresponded to the French Fourth Republic (1947-1958), Gaullist diplomacy (1958-1969) developed a vision of neutrality which was in line with his plan for a Europe of nations. The repression of the Prague spring then the CSCE created the conditions for a fresh debate on the position of the Neutrals in East-West relations all through the 1970s, at the very time that détente reached its limits and the Cold War entered its final phase.