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13 octobre 2011
- handle: 10670/1.nobitq
- halshs: halshs-00632171
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Lotka's law Mean Field Game Academic production incentives Lotka's law. C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games I - Health, Education, and Welfare/I.I2 - Education and Research Institutions/I.I2.I23 - Higher Education • Research Institutions O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O3 - Innovation • Research and Development • Technological Change • Intellectual Property Rights/O.O3.O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and IncentivesSujets proches
Scientific research Science research Science--Research Legislative acts Legislative enactments Acts, Legislative Enactments, Legislative Laws (Statutes) divertissement jeuxCiter ce document
Damien Besancenot et al., « Piecework versus merit pay: a Mean Fi eld Game approach to academic behavior », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.nobitq
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This paper applies the Mean Fi eld Game approach pioneered by Lasry and Lions (2007) to the analysis of the researchers' academic productivity. It provides a theoretical motivation for the stability of the universaly observed Lotka's law. It shows that a remuneration scheme taking into account the researchers rank with respect to the academic resume can induce a larger number of researchers to overtake a minimal production standard. It thus appears as superior to piecework remuneration.