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- handle: 10670/1.npcu62
- halshs: halshs-00754068
- doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.005
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.005
Mots-clés
Deterrence Organized crime Corruption Oligopoly Free entry K - Law and Economics/K.K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior/K.K4.K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O1 - Economic Development/O.O1.O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors • Shadow Economy • Institutional ArrangementsSujets proches
Corruption Corrupt practices Penology Penalties (Criminal law)Citer ce document
Maurice Kugler et al., « Organized crime, corruption and punishment », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.005
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Résumé
We analyze an oligopoly model in which differentiated criminal organizations globally compete on criminal activities and engage in local corruption to avoid punishment. When bribing costs are low, that is badly-paid and dishonest law enforcers work in a weak governance environment, and the rents from criminal activity are sufficiently high, we find that increasing policing and sanctions can generate higher crime rates. Indeed, beyond a threshold, further increases in intended expected punishment create incentives for organized crime to extend corruption rings, and ensuing impunity results in a fall of actual expected punishment that yields more rather than less crime.