Do Standard-Essential Patent Owners Behave Opportunistically? Evidence from U.S. District Court Dockets
Fiche du document
2023
- handle: 10670/1.nugqh0
- hal: hal-04547832
- doi: 10.1093/aler/ahad010
- WOS: 001145438400001
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1093/aler/ahad010
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Litigation Standards Patents Holdup U.S K - Law and Economics/K.K1 - Basic Areas of Law/K.K1.K11 - Property Law K - Law and Economics/K.K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior/K.K4.K41 - Litigation Process L - Industrial Organization/L.L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities/L.L9.L96 - Telecommunications O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O3 - Innovation • Research and Development • Technological Change • Intellectual Property Rights/O.O3.O34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual CapitalSujets proches
Animal behavior Habits and behaviorCiter ce document
Brian Love et al., « Do Standard-Essential Patent Owners Behave Opportunistically? Evidence from U.S. District Court Dockets », HAL-SHS : droit et gestion, ID : 10.1093/aler/ahad010
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
To what extent and with what effect do owners of standard-essential patents (SEPs) “hold-up” companies that produce standard-compliant products? To explore this question, we construct measures of opportunistic patent licensing behaviors using detailed information collected from the dockets of U.S. patent cases filed (2010-2019) to enforce SEPs and a matched sample of non-SEPs. Overall, we find evidence of opportunistic behavior by the patent enforcer in approximately 77% of SEP and 65% of non-SEP assertions in court. The figures mask important heterogeneity. There is significantly more opportunistic conduct aimed at increasing a potential licensee’s loss if the patent enforcer prevails in court: 35% of SEP assertions vs. 10% of non-SEP assertions. In contrast, conduct that increases a potential licensee’s litigation costs is less common and the difference between SEP assertions (8%) and non-SEP assertions (6%) is small. We also show that opportunistic behavior is associated with case outcomes, with the effect on settlement depending on the type of opportunistic behavior. Behavior that increases a potential licensee’s litigation costs is associated with an increase in the probabilityof settlement, while behavior that increases a potential licensee’s loss if the patent enforcer prevails in court is negatively associated with settlement.