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janvier 2016
- handle: 10670/1.o3redi
- halshs: halshs-01328626
- doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.10.007
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.10.007
Mots-clés
Corruption Incomplete contracts Moral hazard Principal–agent–supervisor model Public–private partnerships Risk allocation D - Microeconomics/D.D2 - Production and Organizations/D.D2.D23 - Organizational Behavior • Transaction Costs • Property Rights D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design K - Law and Economics/K.K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior/K.K4.K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law L - Industrial Organization/L.L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise/L.L3.L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions • Privatization • Contracting OutSujets proches
Incomplete contracts--Law and legislationCiter ce document
Elisabetta Iossa et al., « Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness », HALSHS : archive ouverte en Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société, ID : 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.10.007
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Résumé
We analyze risk allocation and contractual choices when public procurement is plagued with moral hazard, private information on exogenous shocks, and threat of corruption. Complete contracts entail state-contingent clauses that compensate the contractor for shocks unrelated to his own effort. By improving insurance, those contracts reduce the agency cost of moral hazard. When the contractor has private information on revenues shocks, verifying messages on shocks realizations is costly. Incomplete contracts do not specify state-contingent clauses, thereby saving on verifiability costs. This makes incomplete contracts attractive even though they entail greater agency costs. Because of private information on contracting costs, a public official may have discretion to choose whether to procure under a complete or an incomplete contract. When the public official is corrupt, such delegation results in incomplete contracts being chosen too often. Empirical predictions on the use of incomplete contracts and policy implications on the benefits of standardized contracts are discussed.