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11 septembre 2017
- handle: 10670/1.o4vyqx
- hal: hal-01941516
http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/licences/copyright/
Mots-clés
banking union bank supervision financial integration G - Financial Economics/G.G2 - Financial Institutions and Services/G.G2.G28 - Government Policy and Regulation G - Financial Economics/G.G2 - Financial Institutions and Services/G.G2.G21 - Banks • Depository Institutions • Micro Finance Institutions • Mortgages L - Industrial Organization/L.L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy/L.L5.L51 - Economics of RegulationSujets proches
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Jean-Edouard Colliard, « Optimal Supervisory Architecture and Financial Integration in a Banking Union », HAL-SHS : droit et gestion, ID : 10670/1.o4vyqx
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Résumé
Both in the United States and in the Euro Area, bank supervision is the joint responsibility of local and central supervisors. I study a model in which local supervisors do not internalize as many externalities as a central supervisor. Local supervisors are more lenient, but banks also have weaker incentives to hide information from them. These two forces can make a joint supervisory architecture optimal, with more weight put on centralized supervision when cross-border externalities are larger. Conversely, more centralized supervision endogenously encourages banks to integrate more cross-border. Due to this complementarity, the economy can be trapped in an equilibrium with both too little central supervision and too little financial integration, when a superior equilibrium would be achievable.