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11 mars 2024
- handle: 10670/1.o7a4mc
- hal: hal-04183244
- doi: 10.46298/jpe.12256
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.46298/jpe.12256
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/ , info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
inflation conservative banker Principal-Agent contract financial autonomy budgetary financingSujets proches
Independence Self-governmentCiter ce document
Ion Pohoață et al., « The independence of central banks: a reductio ad absurdum », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.46298/jpe.12256
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Résumé
This paper testifies to the fact that the proclaimed independence of central banks, as conceived by its founders, is nothing more than a chimera. We demonstrate that the hypothesis ‘inflation is a purely monetary phenomenon’ does not substantiate the case for independence. Further, the portrayal of the conservative central banker, the imaginary principal-agent contract, the alleged financial autonomy, along with the ban on budgetary financing, amount to flawed logic in arguing for the independence of the central bank. We also highlight that the idea of independence is not convincing due to the absence of well-defined outlines in its operational toolbox and the system of rules it relies upon.