2012
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Stéphane Lemaire, « The FA Analysis of Emotional Values and Practical Reasons », HAL-SHS : philosophie, ID : 10.1017/S0012217312000224
Confronted with the “wrong kind of reason problem”, several proponents of the fitting attitude analysis of emotional values have argued in favor of an epistemic approach. In such a view, an emotion fits its object because the emotion is correct. However, I argue that we should reorient our search towards a practical approach because only practical considerations can provide a satisfying explanation of the fittingness of emotional responses. This practical approach is partially revisionist, particularly because it is no longer an analysis of final value and because it is relativistic.