2015
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.joep.2015.01.003
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
David Masclet et al., « Gender differences in tournament and flat-wage schemes: An experimental study », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.joep.2015.01.003
We present a new experiment that explores gender differences in both performance and compensation choices. While most of the previous studies have focused on tournament vs. piece-rate schemes, the originality of our study consists in examining the gender gap in the context of a flat wage scheme. Our data indicate that females exert a significantly higher effort than men in fixed payment schemes. We find however no gender difference in performance under the tournament scheme, due to a combination of two effects. On the one hand, men more significantly increase their effort when switching from a flat wage to a tournament scheme. On the other hand, when switching from the flat wage to a tournament scheme, women have less margin to increase performance since their effort was already relatively high with a flat wage. We also find that females are more likely than males to choose a flat-wage scheme than a tournament. This gap however narrows dramatically when feedback on previous experience is provided.