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30 septembre 2018
- handle: 10670/1.ogel4s
- halshs: halshs-01884213
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
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Posted wages Mismatch Efficiency Minimum wage Layoff taxSujets proches
Wages--Minimum wage Minimum wagesCiter ce document
Frédéric Gavrel, « Mismatch and Wage Posting », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.ogel4s
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Résumé
This paper provides a wage posting model of the labor market in which workers' search strategies are pure. To that end, the persistency of vacant jobs results from a mismatch problem, not a pure coordination problem. Since firms cannot commit to an output cutoff lower than the announced wage, laissez-faire is inefficient. Under a binding condition however, public policy can restore market efficiency by associating a minimum wage with a layoff tax.