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- handle: 10670/1.ol26l7
- hal: hal-03863573
- doi: 10.1257/mic.20200174
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1257/mic.20200174
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D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • UnawarenessSujets proches
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Takuro Yamashita et al., « On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1257/mic.20200174
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In private-value auction environments, Chung and Ely (2007) establish maxmin and Bayesian foundations for dominant-strategy mechanisms. We first show that similar foundation results for ex post mechanisms hold true even with interdependent values if the interdependence is only cardinal. This includes, for example, the one-dimensional environments of Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Bergemann and Morris (2009b). Conversely, if the environment exhibits ordinal interdependence, which is typically the case with multi-dimensional environments (e.g., a player’s private information)