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2010
- handle: 10670/1.oq2wwm
- hal: hal-00540799
Mots-clés
Mechanism design incentives Bayesian equilibrium communication networks encryption secure transmission codingSujets proches
Communication, Primitive Mass communicationCiter ce document
Tristan Tomala et al., « Mechanism design and communication networks », HALSHS : archive ouverte en Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société, ID : 10670/1.oq2wwm
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Résumé
This paper characterizes the communication networks for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is (partially) implementable. In environments with either common independent beliefs and private values or a bad outcome, we show that any incentive-compatible social choice function is implementable on a given communication network if and only if the network is weakly 2-connected. A network is weakly 2-connected if each player is either directly connected to the designer or indirectly connected to the designer through one of the disjoint path emanating from another player with two disjoint paths to the designer. We couple encryption techniques together with appropriate incentives to secure the transmission of each player's private information to the designer.