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- handle: 10670/1.oqwjm2
- halshs: halshs-01480525
- doi: 10.1007/s10683-016-9508-x
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s10683-016-9508-x
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Mots-clés
Coordination game Cheap talk communication Oath C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness -fin]Sujets proches
Communication, Primitive Mass communicationCiter ce document
Nicolas Jacquemet et al., « Coordination with communication under oath », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1007/s10683-016-9508-x
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Résumé
We focus on the design of an institutional device aimed to foster coordination through communication. We explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment, implemented via a truth-telling oath, can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment under oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50 percent; (2) senders' messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers' trust of messages increased.