Fiche du document
2014
- handle: 10670/1.ouk82q
- hal: hal-01474437
- doi: 10.1093/qje/qju027
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1093/qje/qju027
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Economie quantitativeSujets proches
Taxation of income Personal income tax Taxable incomeCiter ce document
Etienne Lehmann et al., « Tax me if you can! Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Between Competing Governments », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1093/qje/qju027
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
We investigate how potential tax-driven migrations modify the Mirrlees income tax schedule when two countries play Nash. The social objective is the maximin and preferences are quasi-linear in consumption. Individuals differ both in skills and migration costs, which are continuously distributed. We derive the optimal marginal income tax rates at the equilibrium, extending the Diamond-Saez formula. We show that the level and the slope of the semi-elasticity of migration (on which we lack empirical evidence) are crucial to derive the shape of optimal marginal income tax. JEL Codes: D82, H21, H87, F22.