Stabilité stratégique en matière de pollution internationale avec effet de stock. Le cas linéaire

Résumé En Fr

Value and contracts in light of turgot [1769] From a reexamination of « Valeurs et monnaies », this paper evolves two the­sis. The first upholds that the natural contract theory, displayed in the beginning of « Valeurs et monnaies » by Turgot, contains the canonical model of value micro-economic theory. Indeed, by the terms of this value theory, subjective value of goods is equal to their objective value. The second thesis defends that the numerous market contracts of microeconomic theory finds their full consistency into space of natural contracts where they reveal their differences and share a same approach of value, at one and the same time individualistic and naturalistic.

Strategic stability and international stock pollution : the linear case This article deals with cooperation issues in transfrentier pollution problems in a dynamic framework implied by the pollutant's accumulation. Assuming that countries do reevaluate at each period the advantages to cooperate or not given the current stock of pollutant, and under the hypothesis that the countries' environmental damage functions are linear, we define at each moment of time a scheme for abatement costs through financial transfers between countries, which makes cooperation better for each of them than non-cooperation. This sharing scheme is also « strategically stable », in the sense that it discourages coalitions.