Fiche du document
2016
- handle: 10670/1.ov7p80
- halshs: halshs-01267340
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Credit Risks Systemic Risks Clearing Systems Financial System G - Financial Economics/G.G2 - Financial Institutions and Services/G.G2.G21 - Banks • Depository Institutions • Micro Finance Institutions • Mortgages G - Financial Economics/G.G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance/G.G3.G33 - Bankruptcy • Liquidation G - Financial Economics/G.G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance/G.G3.G32 - Financing Policy • Financial Risk and Risk Management • Capital and Ownership Structure • Value of Firms • GoodwillSujets proches
Businesses Firms Companies Enterprises Business organizations Organizations, BusinessCiter ce document
Nicolas Houy et al., « Defaulting firms and systemic risks in financial networks », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.ov7p80
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Résumé
In this paper, we use the axioms introduced in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and Rogers and Veraart (2013) and study their consequences in terms of optimal sets of defaulting firms. We show that, from this point of view, the Absolute Priority axiom is not independent. We also show that the optimal sets of defaulting firms characterized in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) are still optimal when the Limited Payment axiom, implicit in Eisenberg and Noe (2001), is further removed. However, some other optimal sets of defaulting firms appear in this case. Finally, with the help of counterexamples, we show that no further weakening in the set of axioms considered can lead to positive results.