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- handle: 10670/1.p1mrkr
- hal: hal-03470073
- doi: 10.1016/j.jbankfin
- SCIENCESPO: 2441/14bcgn3ce19ns9gv417qkp04in
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jbankfin
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/hdl/2441/14bcgn3ce19ns9gv417qkp04in
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Capital structure Investment Output quality Exports G - Financial Economics/G.G1 - General Financial Markets/G.G1.G11 - Portfolio Choice • Investment Decisions G - Financial Economics/G.G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance/G.G3.G32 - Financing Policy • Financial Risk and Risk Management • Capital and Ownership Structure • Value of Firms • Goodwill F - International Economics/F.F1 - Trade/F.F1.F14 - Empirical Studies of Trade L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure • Size Distribution of FirmsSujets proches
Industrial economics Market structure Capital assets Fixed assets Businesses Firms Companies Enterprises Business organizations Organizations, BusinessCiter ce document
Flora Bellone et al., « Financial leverage and export quality: evidence from France », Archive ouverte de Sciences Po (SPIRE), ID : 10.1016/j.jbankfin
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Résumé
Does corporate financial structure matter for a firm’s ability to compete in international markets through output quality? This study answers this question by using firm-level export and balance sheet data covering a large sample of French manufacturing exporters over the period 1997–2007. The main result is that there is a negative causal relation between a firm’s leverage and export quality, where quality is inferred from the estimation of a discrete choice model of foreign consumers’ demand. This result is robust across different specifications and estimation techniques. In addition, by estimating investment models we find that the negative impact of leverage on quality is consistent with theories predicting that the agency cost of debt determines suboptimal investment.