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13 octobre 2020
- handle: 10670/1.p2fml6
- hal: hal-02875118
- doi: 10.1080/00036846.2020.1761536
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1080/00036846.2020.1761536
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Environmental taxes environmental policy goals Pigouvian taxation double dividend hypothesis Leviathan government dynamic simultaneous equations model Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation/Q.Q2.Q28 - Government Policy H - Public Economics/H.H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies/H.H5.H54 - Infrastructures • Other Public Investment and Capital Stock H - Public Economics/H.H8 - Miscellaneous Issues/H.H8.H87 - International Fiscal Issues • International Public Goods D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D73 - Bureaucracy • Administrative Processes in Public Organizations • Corruption D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and ImplementationSujets proches
Methods of analysis Analysis and chemistry Analytical methods Chemical analysis Analysis methods Analysis and examinationCiter ce document
Isabelle Cadoret et al., « How do governments actually use environmental taxes? », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1080/00036846.2020.1761536
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Résumé
This paper empirically examines how governments actually use environmental taxes, by looking to what extent their resort to this type of taxation is consistent with three alternative interpretations of environmental taxes proposed by the welfare economics theoretical literature: the strict and the loose Pigouvian and the double dividend hypotheses. We also extend our analysis to an alternative vision of politics, the Leviathan model, to verify how governments that are imperfectly accountable use environmental taxes. Each theory leads to alternative testable hypotheses, which we verify on a sample that minimizes the analysts' discretionary evaluations, the EU-28 countries that committed themselves to reducing the greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. The estimates lend support to the strict Pigouvian hypothesis and, to a lesser extent, to a version of the double dividend hypothesis, where personal income taxes are "recycled" by environmental ones. The other interpretations do not appear consistent with the data.