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- handle: 10670/1.pf1jwf
- halshs: halshs-00180038
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
bargaining agenda decision authority efficient contract experiment right to manage autorité de décision contrat efficient droit-à-gérer expérience ordre du jour des négociationsSujets proches
Bargaining Labor negotiationsCiter ce document
Manfred Königstein et al., « The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: efficiency and behavioral considerations », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.pf1jwf
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Résumé
The labor economics literature has shown that the “efficient bargaining” model, in which wage and employment are negotiated simultaneously, is less frequently used on unionized markets than the less efficient “right-to-manage” model, in which wage is determined via bargaining and employment determined subsequently and unilaterally by the firm. This paper reports an experiment in which the choice of the bargaining agenda is endogenous within a noncooperative game. We find that participants show a preference for decision authority and choose single-issue bargaining in most cases even though efficiency is lower than in multi-issue bargaining. Furthermore, multi-issue bargaining induces unions to offer smaller payoff shares and leads to a higher conflict rate than in a single-issue bargaining.