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- handle: 10670/1.pfwsyy
- hal: hal-03641810
- doi: 10.1111/iere.12536
- WOS: 000678415600001
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/iere.12536
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Mots-clés
Labor market frictions Search and matching Nash bargaining Informality Returns to schoolingSujets proches
Students--Education Children--Education Education of children Schooling Pedagogy Youth--Education Instruction Education, Primitive Human resource developmentCiter ce document
Matteo Bobba et al., « Labor market search, informality and schooling investments », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1111/iere.12536
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Résumé
We develop a search and matching model where matches (jobs) can be formal or informal. Workers choose their level of schooling and search for an employee job either as unemployed or as self-employed. Firms post vacancies in each schooling market, decide the formality status of the job, and bargain with workers over wages. The resulting equilibrium size of the informal sector is an endogenous function of labor market and institutional characteristics. We estimate the model parameters using labor force survey data from Mexico and the exogenous variation induced by the roll-out of a non-contributory social program. Counterfactual experiments based on the estimated model show that eliminating informal jobs increases schooling investments but at the cost of decreasing welfare for both workers and firms.