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17 octobre 2017
- handle: 10670/1.pwbous
- halshs: halshs-01618054
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
contract design brand strategy agency theory distance C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General/C.C1.C12 - Hypothesis Testing: General L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L14 - Transactional Relationships • Contracts and Reputation • Networks M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M2 - Business Economics/M.M2.M21 - Business EconomicsSujets proches
Military strategy Dynasties (Royal houses) Royalty Royal families Rulers Sovereigns Royalty Royalty Royalty Payment--Law and legislation Business economics Rulers Monarchs Kings and rulers, Primitive Sovereigns Royalty Proof Contract law Contracts--Law and legislation Contractual limitations Limitations, Contractual AgreementsCiter ce document
Eugênio José Silva Bitti et al., « Franchisors' choice between royalties and fixed fees evidence from Brazil », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.pwbous
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Résumé
In franchise contracts, the royalty rate and the fixed entrance fee are the main monetary clauses defining the payment scheme between the franchisor and the franchisee. In the traditional agency view, the presence of distant outlets leads the franchisor to choose a payment mechanism designed to provide incentives to the franchisee; that is, a low royalty rate associated with a high fixed fee. Based on a unique panel dataset, we provide evidence that, in the Brazilian context, spatial dispersion has the opposite impact, with interesting practical and research implications.