Considering Possibilities. G.F. Stout and the Meinongian Annahme

Résumé En

Meinong's famous concept of assumption (Annahme) was integrated by Stout into his own work as the notion of « supposal » in 1911. This paper examines the rationale of such an explicit import into Stout's views and reasoning. Initially interested in the problem of error and in the non-doxastic thinking that is involved in fictions, hypothetical reasoning, as well as in thoughts about alternative possibilities, universals, and propositions, Stout incorporated the Meinongian concept of assumption into his views as a psychic attitude fitted for accounting for such thoughts. We argue in this respect, that such an integration could occur due to a strong analogy between Meinong's realm of objects and Stout's universe of alternative possibilities. Meinongian assumptions were dedicated to the non-doxastic grasping of objects through « objectives » while Stoutian supposals were dedicated to the non-doxastic consideration of alternative possibilities.