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2019
- handle: 10670/1.py8q9r
- hal: hal-01966705
- doi: 10.1017/S0266267118000214
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1017/S0266267118000214
Mots-clés
D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D80 - General D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and UncertaintySujets proches
Decision (Psychology) Decision processes Making decisions Decision analysis Management--Decision making Deciding Management decisionsCiter ce document
Brian Hill, « CONFIDENCE IN BELIEFS AND RATIONAL DECISION MAKING », HAL-SHS : philosophie, ID : 10.1017/S0266267118000214
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Résumé
The standard, Bayesian account of rational belief and decision is often argued to be unable to cope properly with severe uncertainty, of the sort ubiquitous in some areas of policy making. This paper tackles the question of what should replace it as a guide for rational decision making. It defends a recent proposal, which reserves a role for the decision maker’s confidence in beliefs. Beyond being able to cope with severe uncertainty, the account has strong normative credentials on the main fronts typically evoked as relevant for rational belief and decision. It fares particularly well, we argue, in comparison to other prominent non-Bayesian models in the literature.