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22 mars 2022
- handle: 10670/1.q0achw
- halshs: halshs-03620661
- doi: 10.1177/0003603X221082757
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1177/0003603X221082757
Mots-clés
Self-preferencing antitrust regulation European Union competition law exploitative abuse Digital Markets ActSujets proches
Competition law Restrictive trade practices Competition--Law and legislation Trade, Restraint of Unfair trade practices Restraint of trade--Law and legislation Trade practices, Unfair Combinations in restraint of trade Competition law Competition--Law and legislation Unfair trade practices Unfair competition Competition, Unfair--Law and legislation Fair trade Trusts, Industrial--Law Competition law Trusts, Industrial--Law and legislation Competition--Law and legislation Anti-trust lawCiter ce document
Patrice Bougette et al., « Self-Preferencing and Competitive Damages: A Focus on Exploitative Abuses », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1177/0003603X221082757
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Résumé
Conceived as a theory of competitive harm, self-preferencing has been at the core of recent European landmark cases (e.g., Google Android, Google Shopping). In the context of EU competition law, beyond the anticompetitive leveraging effect, self-preferencing may lead to vertical and horizontal exclusionary abuses, encourage exploitation abuses, and generate economic dependence abuses. In this paper, we aim at characterizing the various forms of self-preferencing, investigating platforms’ capacity and incentives to do so through their dual role, by shedding light on the economic assessment of these practices in an effects-based approach. We analyze the different options for remedies in this context, by insisting on their necessity, adequacy, and proportionality.