Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation

Fiche du document

Date

2017

Type de document
Périmètre
Langue
Identifiants
Relations

Ce document est lié à :
http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa

Licence

Estudios de Economía




Citer ce document

Hamid Hamoudi et al., « Optimal Zoning in Spatial Differentiation », Estudios de Economía, ID : 10670/1.q3mat2


Métriques


Partage / Export

Résumé 0

"This study analyzes optimal zoning policy in a duopolistic spatial competition framework for both circular and linear spaces. A regulator is introduced in the third stage of the price-location game through a welfare function to model zoning preferences from firms and consumers. An equilibrium outcome is then found for both spatial configurations. When the regulator is inclined to favor consumers (consumer-oriented) both firms are restricted to locate at one point to serve the whole market. Nevertheless, when the preferences of the regulator are biased towards firms (firm-oriented) the zoning area is maximized, with both firms being located at the market boundaries. The equilibrium outcome confirms location patterns found in real life situations under a non-neutral regulator."

document thumbnail

Par les mêmes auteurs

Sur les mêmes sujets

Sur les mêmes disciplines

Exporter en