Fiche du document
- handle: 10670/1.q8tme1
- hal: hal-03426120
- doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3900451
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.2139/ssrn.3900451
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/ , info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Stakeholder Shareholder value Profit Pigou tax D - Microeconomics/D.D2 - Production and Organizations/D.D2.D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D40 - General D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D60 - General L - Industrial Organization/L.L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior/L.L2.L21 - Business Objectives of the FirmSujets proches
Net incomeCiter ce document
Marc Fleurbaey et al., « The stakeholder corporation and social welfare », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.2139/ssrn.3900451
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
The stakeholder (or responsible) firm is defined in this paper as one that maximizes the (weighted or unweighted) sum of the surpluses of its customers and suppliers (including workers). We show that, although this objective is hard to empirically measure, it can be pursued by simple management rules that rely on constrained profit maximization. We find that unconstrained profit maximization gives a competitive edge to ordinary firms, but that stakeholder firms are better for social welfare and internalize several important effects of their activities on society. We also show that long term entry decisions should rely on profit modied by Pigouvian pricing of externalities, incidentally providing a novel justication for the polluter-pays principle.