Grant legislation vs. political factors as determinants of soft budget spending behaviors. Comparison between Italian and French regions
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2013
- handle: 10670/1.qdrova
- halshs: halshs-00920780
Mots-clés
Comparative analysis Unitary states Transfer expectations Soft budget spending behavior Intergovernmental relations Local public spending Bailing out H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H71 - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H73 - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H77 - Intergovernmental Relations • Federalism • Secession D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation P - Economic Systems/P.P4 - Other Economic Systems/P.P4.P43 - Public Economics • Financial Economics P - Economic Systems/P.P4 - Other Economic Systems/P.P4.P48 - Political Economy • Legal Institutions • Property Rights • Natural Resources • Energy • Environment • Regional Studies P - Economic Systems/P.P5 - Comparative Economic Systems/P.P5.P52 - Comparative Studies of Particular EconomiesSujets proches
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Jean-Michel Josselin et al., « Grant legislation vs. political factors as determinants of soft budget spending behaviors. Comparison between Italian and French regions », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.qdrova
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Résumé
This paper analyses intergovernmental transfers in France and Italy to assess to which extent soft budget spending behaviors result from slack in fiscal constraints or from political factors. It innovates on the previous literature, which concentrated on single countries, by adopting a comparative perspective. We estimate two separate but identical autoregressive forecasting models on French and Italian data to evaluate how rules and political factors lead the regional administrators of each country to form their expectations about the amount of transfers they will receive from the central government. This allows to proxy the transfer expectations in both countries and their role in determining soft budget spending behaviors. The estimates indicate that transfer expectations are a quantitatively important component of regional spending in both countries, regardless the different degrees of stringency of grant legislations and the type of grants and expenditures (total, current and capital) examined.