Strategic Behavior in a Coalition-Based Presidential System: Executive-Legislative Relations in the Budgetary Process in Brazil
Fiche du document
2002
- handle: 10670/1.qh9okd
- 0011-5258
Ce document est lié à :
http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa
Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais
Sujets proches
Service of process Service of papers Abuse of process Process BudgetingCiter ce document
Bernardo Mueller et al., « Strategic Behavior in a Coalition-Based Presidential System: Executive-Legislative Relations in the Budgetary Process in Brazil », Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais, ID : 10670/1.qh9okd
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
"In Brazil the executive has exclusive rights to initiate the annual budget.Legislators have the right to amend the bill; but only if those amendments arecompatible with the multi-year budget plan elaborated by the executive aswell as with the law on budgetary guidelines. Moreover, congress may notauthorize expenditures that exceed the budgetary revenue. It is also theexecutive, who is entitled to determine which amendment will really beappropriated, as the appropriation is contingent on the availability ofresources in the national treasury. This paper argues that those rules not onlyrestrict congressional action, but also enable the president to preserve at lowcosts its coalition inside Congress. It shows strong evidence that the BrazilianPresident rewards those legislators who most vote for his interests byexecuting their individual amendments to the annual budget and, equally,punishes those who vote less by not executing their individual amendments."