Un proconsulat en trompe-l’œil. Le général Henri Gouraud en Syrie (1919-1923)

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2018

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d’Andurain Julie, « Un proconsulat en trompe-l’œil. Le général Henri Gouraud en Syrie (1919-1923) », Revue historique, ID : 10670/1.qn1jgj


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En 1919, au moment de la sortie de guerre, les populations arabes fidèles aux Alliés durant la Première Guerre mondiale réclament leur indépendance. Chargée de statuer sur le sort des pays arabes issus du démembrement de l’Empire ottoman, la Société des Nations propose de substituer le principe des mandats à celui des protectorats avant de déterminer les modalités de l’indépendance. En attendant, les États européens dépêchent en Orient des hauts fonctionnaires capables d’assumer des fonctions militaires et civiles. Dans ce contexte, le général Henri Gouraud est envoyé prendre en main les destinées de la Syrie. Choisi par Georges Clemenceau pourtant peu suspect de pensée colonialiste, cet officier colonial devenu l’un des grands généraux de la Grande Guerre est nommé pour organiser la relève des troupes britanniques dans la zone d’occupation qui doit revenir à la France, en application des accords Sykes-Picot de 1916. Sa mission consiste à succéder au diplomate François Georges-Picot et assurer le maintien de l’ordre pour l’ensemble de la Syrie. Du fait des tensions locales liées aux règlements de la paix en Orient avec les Arabes représentés par Fayçal, fils de Hussein, chérif de La Mecque, et de Mustapha Kemal en Turquie, on ne lui ménage pas ses pouvoirs. Disposant du titre de Haut-commissaire de la République française en Syrie et de Commandant en chef de l’armée du Levant, Henri Gouraud reçoit un poste à la hauteur de celui qu’avait eu Gallieni à Madagascar ou Lyautey au Maroc. Il reçoit un mandat qui fait de lui un véritable proconsul. Or, à peine arrivé à Beyrouth, il découvre qu’on lui a confié un proconsulat au petit pied car la République lui donne d’une main un pouvoir qu’elle lui refuse de l’autre. Son séjour en Orient de 1919 à 1923 atteste l’émergence d’une nouvelle ère coloniale où le temps de la puissance cède progressivement la place à celui de l’influence.

In 1919, war broke out when the populations of Arab countries aligned with the Allied Powers in the Great War demanded their independence. The League of Nations was in charge of the fate of Arab countries, following the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. A provisional system, the Mandates, was established whilst the League conducted a more detailed study to determine how independence might be granted. The European states deployed senior officials to the Middle East to assume both military and civilian functions, in order to prepare the reorganisation of these territories while also ensuring an effective return to peace. In this context, General Henri Gouraud was selected by the French President of the Council, Georges Clemenceau, to preside over the destiny of Syria. How might one explain why the “Tiger”, who did not favour the colonists, chose to replace the first High Commissioner of Syria, the diplomat Francois Georges-Picot, by a general officer and a member of the “colonial party”? This choice was imposed on Clemenceau by the terms of the Allied withdrawal from the Middle East after the Great War. The Sykes–Picot Agreement of May 1916 was the basis for these negotiations, to the exclusion of all other agreements, such as the earlier McMahon–Hussein Agreement. Since British troops held most Arab cities—including Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo—it was necessary to establish a military succession between the British and the French. A colonial officer highly-regarded by his peers, General Gouraud (1867–1946) had distinguished himself during the Great War both in Gallipoli (1915) and on the Champagne front (1917–18), commanding the IVth Army. Moreover, the Government was grateful to Gouraud for maintaining cordial relations with the British commanders, above all Sir Ian Hamilton. Clemenceau asked him to arrange the withdrawal of the British forces under General Sir Edmund Allenby, and their replacement by French troops. Beyond the military succession, Gouraud’s mission was simply to maintain order in Syria until the League of Nations decided on its fate. Due to local tensions in the Middle East—relating to peace negotiations between the Arabs (represented by Faisal, son of Hussein, the Sheriff of Mecca) and the Turks (led by Mustapha Kemal)—Gouraud’s powers of diplomacy were to be tested. With the title of High Commissioner of the French Republic in Syria and Commander-in-Chief of the Levantine Army, Gouraud’s post was equivalent to that of Gallieni in Madagascar and Lyautey in Morocco. With a proconsulat in the manner of ancient governors or, more recently, his British colleagues in Egypt, Gouraud was missioned to build a “Great Syria”. Many of Gouraud’s staff were officers who had transferred from Morocco, further confirming his role as the “Lyautey of Syria”. However, arriving at the Syrian mandate headquarters in Beirut, General Gouraud and his civilian assistant, Robert de Caix, discovered that they had been provided with a proconsulat “on the cheap”. The reason lay in the post-war agreements that followed in the Eastern Mediterranean – a Braudelian scheme. In Europe, the peacetime practice of “sharing the World” regained its status when Clemenceau was replaced by Alexander Millerand. Continuing to approach post-war negotiations on an imperial scale, the Quai d’Orsay chose to collaborate with Mustapha Kemal and the Turks rather than with Faisal. The Arab nationalists found themselves in a “race against the clock” to validate the secret agreements signed by Faisal and Clemenceau in January 1920. Under Millerand, France’s policy in the east was becoming more nebulous, and the lines were starting to blur. The Arab nationalists sought to overcome these difficulties by proclaiming Faisal the King of Syria in March 1920. But it soon became clear that the new French President of the Council (also the Minister of Foreign Affairs) did not wish Faisal to forge an independent Syria. As Millerand considered it impossible to honour the agreement signed by Clemenceau, he issued secret instructions to demand that General Gouraud take control of Damascus. The battle of Khan Meyssaloun, on 24 July 1920, put an end to Faisal’s dream of a Syrian Arab kingdom. Yet by allowing Gouraud to install the mandate in Syria, it was to be a Pyrrhic victory. Exiled by the English, Faisal was swiftly proclaimed King of Iraq in August 1921 and viewed as the true liberator of the Arab territories. Gouraud escaped the attack at Kuneitra on 23 June 1921, but not the Arab nationalist propaganda that has discredited him ever since. Despite efforts to comply with the “spirit of the mandate”, he quickly understood that he could not embody the “colonial humanism” promoted by the new Colonial Minister, Albert Sarraut. In reality, his stay in the Middle East from 1919 to 1923 attests to the emergence of a new colonial era, where power gradually gave way to mere influence.

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