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- handle: 10670/1.qs1p3i
- halshs: halshs-01545856
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Principal-agent incentive constraints Iran Targeted Subsidies social valuations AIDS D82 H21 L51 D - Microeconomics/D.D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics/D.D1.D12 - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue/H.H2.H21 - Efficiency • Optimal Taxation L - Industrial Organization/L.L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy/L.L5.L51 - Economics of RegulationSujets proches
Duties Fee system (Taxation) Taxation, Incidence of Tax reform Tax policy Taxes Grants Subventions Vouchers (Subsidies) Corporate subsidies Welfare, Corporate Government subsidies Business subsidies Corporate welfare Government aid Federal aidCiter ce document
Stéphane Gauthier et al., « How incentives matter ? An illustration from the Targeted Subsidies reform in Iran », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.qs1p3i
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Résumé
We use the Targeted Subsidies Reform implemented in Iran in 2011 to recover empirically the social valuations of Iranian households relying on the assumption of optimal taxes. Unlike the existing literature, we do not restrict attention to a specific pattern for the incentive constraints associated with nonlinear income taxation. Instead we recover the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to these constraints. We find evidence of a significant redistribution toward the bottom three deciles of the income distribution before the reform. This redistribution is however limited by an incentive constraint where the rich envy the social treatment of the poor. At the outcome of the reform incentives no longer matter and the social welfare function of the government of Iran displays a Benthamite-like form.