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- handle: 10670/1.r6gcgi
- halshs: halshs-01379060
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
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WorkingPublic good game Social Preference Truth Keywords: Public good game C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • UnawarenessSujets proches
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Jérôme Hergueux et al., « Leveraging the Honor Code: Public Goods Contributions under Oath », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.r6gcgi
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Real economic commitment (or the lack of it) of others affects a person's preferences to cooperate. But what if the commitment of others cannot be observed ex ante? Herein we examine how a classic non-monetary institution– a solemn oath of honesty –creates economic commitment within the public goods game. Commitment-through-the-oath asks people to hold themselves to a higher standard of integrity. Our results suggest the oath can increase cooperation (by 33%)– but the oath does not change preferences for cooperation. Rather people react quicker and cooperate, taking less time to ponder on the strategic free riding behavior.